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1It has been long recognized that R&D and the distribution of benefits generated by it are
crucial for economic growth. The endogenous growth literature has shown that markets
typically provide too little R&D and has singled out subsidies to R&D as the main policy
tool (e.g. Howitt 1999, Segerstrom 2000). Innovation ranks high on the policy agenda and
R&D subsidies have become ubiquitous in practice, being one of the most important tools
of innovation policy both in the U.S. and in many European countries.1
Some central questions concerning R&D and innovation policy remain however
open. For example, our understanding of the social returns to innovation is still limited,
nor is there much evidence on the joint distribution of private and social returns to R&D.
Little is known on how spillovers are related to the level of R&D at project level. Further,
we know surprisingly little about the programs that allocate R&D subsidies. How do the
public agencies running programs decide subsidy levels? How do potential applicants
decide whether or not to apply? What are the agencies’ and the applicants’ costs and
benefits  from the  program,  and  how are  they  determined?  In  other  words,  what  are  the
treatment effects of such a program, and their determinants? To answer these questions
we build and estimate a structural model founded on the well-established treatment
effects literature and the recent advances in structural industrial organization. Our
empirical application uses detailed project level data on R&D investment plans and
project characteristics, and R&D subsidy decisions by a government agency.
Methodologically we draw on the extensive treatment effects and labor supply
literatures (see e.g. Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999, Blundell and Costa-Dias 2002
1 R&D subsidies are the second largest and fastest growing form of industrial aid in developed
countries (Nevo 1998); the U.S. has had several programs (Lerner 1999) and currently spends $1.5
billion  a  year  on  one  R&D  subsidy  program  alone  (the  SBIR;  see
http://www.sba.gov/sbir/indexwhatwedo.html, visited on January 21, 2004) and the EU exempts R&D
subsidies from its state aid rules. In Finland where our data originates, R&D subsidies are the most
important tool of innovation policy (Georghiu et al. 2003).
2and Blundell and MaCurdy 1999 for surveys)2 and on structural industrial organization
work (surveyed by e.g. Reiss and Wolak, 2004).3 While our objective is to construct and
estimate a structural model of the application and selection process into a voluntary
treatment program, the institutional setting in our data differs considerably from those
usually encountered in the treatment effects literature. As a result, our model contains
several ingredients not commonly embedded in the structural treatment effects literature.
We model a continuous, optimal treatment with outcome heterogeneity. In our model the
treatment outcome is a function of the applicant's investment, which in turn is a function
of the received treatment. The model takes into account application costs, and isolates the
effects  of  the  treatment  that  are  specific  to  the  agency.  Under  the  assumption  of  a
benevolent public agency, our model identifies general equilibrium treatment effects and
social returns to R&D. A key benefit of the structural approach is that the model yields
economic interpretation of the unobserved (to the econometrician) shocks and all the
estimated parameters. Given our parameterization of the model, it also yields estimation
equations that resemble those traditionally used in e.g. the returns to education literature.
Our empirical application relates to the extensive literatures on innovation and the
effects R&D subsidies. The existing empirical research has produced indisputable
insights into the effects of R&D and R&D subsidies but, in many cases, advances have
2 The papers in the treatment program literature having a close relation to ours include Bjorklund and
Moffitt (1987), Heckman and Robb (1985), Maddala (1983, ch. 9), Manski (2000), and Heckman and
Smith (2004) who stress the application and selection decisions, as well as Keane and Wolpin (2001) and
Cameron and Taber (2004) who evaluate the effects of tuition subsidies and borrowing constraints. Our
paper has a link with the literature on revealed bureaucrat preferences such as McFadden (1975, 1976) who
examines bureaucratic decision making in freeway route selection and Heckman, Smith and Taber (1996)
who study how the objectives of the office holders affect the selection decisions. Dehejia (2005), like us,
models the selection decisions of the public agency. Willis and Rosen’s (1979) contribution on education is
also in many ways close to our paper. Although the literature on continuous treatment effects and general
equilibrium effects is sparse, Heckman (1997) provides theoretical insights in the modeling of continuous
treatment effects and Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) generalize the standard discrete zero-one treatment
model to multiple treatment levels. Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) and Davidson and Woodbury
(1993) in turn suggest procedures to identify general equilibrium treatment effects.
3 In the structural industrial organization literature, Wolak (1994) and Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) are
close to ours methodologically.
3been hampered by lack of sufficient data. For example, the established but unsettled
literature on the R&D-size relationship (see e.g. Cohen 1995) relies almost exclusively on
firm level data. The literature on the effects of R&D subsidies is diverse, and
methodologically mostly distinct from our approach (see David, Hall, and Toole 2000,
and Klette, Møen and Griliches 2000, for surveys). The only paper we know that studies
the granting and application side of R&D subsidies is Blanes and Busom (2004). They
estimate reduced form models of the joint application and granting decision. Their main
finding that firms even in the same industry have different application thresholds both
within and between the agencies supports our model and results. Wallsten (2000) and
Gonzaléz, Jaumandreau, and Pazó (2005) are rare exceptions in taking a more structural
approach to modeling the effects of R&D subsidies. Structural modeling is, however,
used more extensively in many other areas of innovation research.4
We have access to rich data from Tekes (the National Technology Agency of
Finland), the sole source of R&D subsidies in Finland. Finland provides a neat case for
our study because i) innovation policy has long been a central theme in government
policy, ii) partly because of successful policy, Finland has particularly rapidly
transformed to a technology intensive economy (see e.g. Trajtenberg 2001), and iii)
subsidies and, as a result, Tekes, constitute the main innovation policy tool. For example,
there are no R&D tax benefits that could jeopardize the policy analysis. The data contain
all the subsidy applications, the agency’s internal ratings of the applications and its
decisions over a two- and half-year period (Jan. 2000 – June 2002). The information on
4See, e.g. Pakes (1986) on patent value, Levin and Reiss (1988) on cost-reducing and demand creating
R&D, Lanjouw (1998) on patent value and litigation, Eaton and Kortum (2002) on the role of trade in
diffusing the benefits of new technology, Jovanovic and Eeckhout (2002) on the impact of
technological spillovers on the firm size distribution, and Petrin (2002) on the welfare effects of new
products.
4applications is matched to data on over 14 000 Finnish firms that constitute a large
proportion of potential applicants.
We find that the returns appropriated by the agency but not by the firm are linear
in R&D expenditures and positive in expectation for 97% of the firms in our sample.
Private returns are very high and their distribution skew, following earlier findings at
least since Griliches (1958). Non-applicants’ projects generate larger returns on
investments, but applicants’ and non-applicants’ projects generate similar joint rates of
return on the subsidy program, defined as the sum of the applicants’ and agency’s returns
divided by the cost of subsidies. We also identify new treatment effects by measuring the
effect of treatments on the agency, and by taking into account application costs. We find
considerable heterogeneity in all treatment effects. Neglecting application costs causes a
significant upward bias. In allocating the subsidies, the agency generally adheres to the
publicly announced principles.
In Section II we present our model. We explain the institutional background and
data in Section III and statistical assumptions, identification and estimation in Section IV.
Econometric results are reported in Section V and implications of the model in Section
VI. Conclusions are in Section VII.
II. The model
Our empirical application resembles what Jaffe (2002) calls a ‘canonical’ research grant
program:  There  is  a  pool  of  firms  (potential  applicants)  who  have  R&D  projects  that
require costly investments. The firms decide whether or not to apply for a subsidy
(treatment) program. A subsidy, if received, lowers the marginal cost of their investment.
The program is run by a public agency whose objective function includes the firms’
utility as an argument. The agency screens and evaluates the project proposals and then
5decides how large subsidy (treatment), if any, to give to each actual applicant. Finally, all
firms – those that did not apply for a subsidy, those that did but were rejected and the
applicants that received a subsidy - maximize profits by choosing their R&D
investments.5
We model the subsidy program as a four-stage game of incomplete information
between a firm (a potential applicant) and the agency. In stage zero, the players' types are
determined. The agency has a three-dimensional type, ( ) 3,, ÂÎ= mcAt wwh , drawn from
a common knowledge joint (normal) distribution and each firm has a two-dimensional
type, 20 ),( ÂÎ= neFt , drawn from a common knowledge bivariate (normal) distribution.
The  type  of  a  player  contributes  to  the  player's  valuation  of  a  project.  As  will  be  made
more precise below, both players’ valuations embody idiosyncratic shocks that constitute
the types. Conditional on publicly observed information the shocks are independently
distributed. In stage one, the firm decides whether or not to apply to the subsidy program.
The application includes a proposal for an R&D project. In stage two, the agency screens
and evaluates  the  proposed  project.  It  then  decides  the  level  of  subsidy, s, which is the
share of the investment cost covered by the agency. The subsidy level can be subject to a
maximum constraint, s , and the level is zero if there is no application or the application
is rejected, so that sÎ[0, s ], s £1. In stage three, the firm makes the R&D investment, R,
),0[ ¥ÎR , with or without the subsidy.
Our model builds on the following assumptions:
A.1. The potential applicant is uncertain about the agency's valuation of her project.
5 Our  model  could  also  deal  with  some  other  treatment  program  than  an  R&D  subsidy  program.  For
example, one can think of expected employment being a project and a free or subsidized participation in an
educational program being a treatment. Those who do not receive the treatment can also often participate in
educational programs such as JTPA but for a full price (see e.g. Heckman and Smith, 1995), so the
treatment effectively reduces the cost of educational investment. The situation we model is also close to the
one in Roberts, Maddala and Enholm (1978) who study what determines whether a regulated firm requests
a review of its regulated rate of return.
6A.2. A subsidy cannot be misused.
A.3. There are no constraints on the firm’s investment.
A.4. The agency’s budget constraint does not bind.
A.5. The firm’s investment is non-contractible.
A.6. All potential general equilibrium effects are captured by the agency’s objective
function.
A.1 ensures that (in line with our data) equilibrium outcomes where a firm applies
for a subsidy only to be turned down are possible. It accommodates various informational
assumptions concerning the players' types. It, for example, makes no difference whether
the firm's type is private information or common knowledge: it turns out that due to our
functional form assumptions (see equations (1) and (5) below), the firm can neither signal
its type nor does the agency care about it. For clarity, we assume that the firm's type is
common knowledge.6
It  is  also  immaterial  whether  the  agency's  type  is  private  information  or  the
potential applicant and the agency operate under symmetric but incomplete information
regarding the agency's type. We only need to assume that the firm, when contemplating
application, does not exactly know how the agency values her project. For brevity, we
assume that the agency learns its type exactly after screening (i.e. symmetric but
incomplete information regarding the agency's type prevails in the application stage).7
6 In an earlier version (HECER DP no. 76/2005) we develop a treatment program model with general
functional forms. There we need to assume that the firm's type is common knowledge to rule out signalling.
That is, with more general functional forms we need to make more restrictive informational assumptions.
7 Alternatively, we could assume that the applicant has private information about the agency's returns to
its  project  and  that  the  agency  receives  a  noisy  signal  upon  it  after  screening  the  project.  Since  the
applicant could not credibly signal its private information in our model, this assumption would yield
the same optimal application and subsidy decisions as the (more realistic) assumption we use.
7A.2 excludes moral hazard problems in the use of a treatment.8 By  A.3,  the
solution to the applicant’s maximization problem in the last stage is interior. This
assumption rules out credit rationing and ensures that a firm's project is executed even if
the firm does not apply for a subsidy or the application is rejected.9 A.4 is motivated by
simplicity,  but  we  do  impose  a  cost  of  financing  on  the  agency.  A.5  is  more  realistic,
since it prevents the firm and the agency from writing a binding contract specifying the
amount the firm invests conditional on the subsidy it receives. A.6 is a weaker form of
the standard, heavily criticized (e.g. Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998), assumption in
the  treatment  literature  that  ignores  general  equilibrium effects.  In  principle  the  agency
should be a benevolent social planner that takes into account all effects of the treatment.
If this is the case, our model will identify general equilibrium treatment effects.
We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria where, in stage one, a potential applicant
correctly anticipates the type-contingent strategies of the agency in stage two, and where
the firm’s and agency’s strategies are sequentially rational. In this extensive form game
the  firm’s  posterior  belief  concerning  the  agency’s  type  after  receiving  a  subsidy  is
inconsequential, so we start from the firm’s maximization problem in stage three.
A. Objective function of the firm and stage three of the game
We specify firm i’s objective function as
(1) iiiiiiiiii RsRXXsR )1(ln)exp(),,,( --++=P ebpe ,
8 In practice, moral hazard temptations are certainly pervasive with monetary treatments, as in our case. As
a result, Tekes has several safe-guards against expropriation. For example, subsidies are only paid against
receipts, there is a euro limit to a subsidy, and a significant number of subsidized R&D projects is annually
randomly audited. Because the safe-guards are common knowledge, and the misuses found in the audits or
otherwise are rare, we think that the assumption depicts equilibrium behavior.
9 Although financial market failure has traditionally been a rationale for R&D subsidies, the revealed
motivations for R&D subsidies have become increasingly spillover-oriented. A study using Finnish data
(Hyytinen and Pajarinen 2003), and an evaluation of Finnish innovation policy (Georghiu et al. 2003)
conclude that only small, R&D intensive, growth-oriented firms may face financial constraints. The
situation is similar in many other industrialized countries, as the survey by Hall (2002) confirms. The
decline of the financial constraint motivation for R&D subsidies is also reflected in our application:
although Tekes also grants low-interest loans, most firms were not interested in them.
8where is  is the subsidy (treatment), iR  is the R&D investment, iX  is a vector of
observable firm characteristics, and ? a vector of parameters to be estimated. The
marginal profitability is also affected by a random shock, ie , (i.e. the (other dimension of)
firm i's type). The random shock ie  is distributed by nature, uncorrelated with the
observable firm characteristics, observed by the firm, and unobserved by the
econometrician. As explained above, it may or may not be observable to the agency. The
reservation value including other projects is embodied in ip .
10
In stage three, the firm chooses its investment Ri to  maximize  (1).  Since  the
objective function is concave in Ri, the first-order condition
(2)
i
ii
i s
XR
-
+
=
1
)exp( eb
gives the firm's optimal investment Ri(si) as an increasing function of the subsidy level.
Equations (1) and (2) show the economic interpretation of ie :  a  positive  shock  to  the
marginal profitability leads to a larger investment. An optimal investment given by (2)
could in theory decrease profits but, in such a case, the firm would not invest at all, and
consequently would not apply for a subsidy.
B. Agency utility and stage two of the game
The agency’s utility from applicant i's project is given by
(3) ( ) ,)(),),(,())(,,(),,,,,( iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii FsRgsssRXsRZVZXssRU --P+= ehhe
where Fi is the sum of the fixed costs of applying and processing the application, g is the
constant opportunity cost of the agency’s resources, e.g. the opportunity cost of tax funds.
As (3) shows, the firm’s utility (1) directly enters the agency’s utility function.
10 We could also generalize (1) to multiple projects. For each firm with multiple project applications, we
could treat each project as a separate observation. If the project-specific unobservables are uncorrelated, this
will not materially affect estimation. The interpretation for non-applicants would be that none of their projects
resulted in an application.
9The interpretation of V( ) is fundamental to our analysis. It captures the agency
specific returns from the project. That is, V( ) captures the effects of the firm’s project on
the agency beyond the firm’s utility and the direct costs of subsidy and the application
process. In our empirical application, V( ) can include externalities from a firm's R&D
such as consumer surplus or spillovers to other firms. At the level of an individual
decision maker V( ) could also consist of idiosyncratic benefits from giving a subsidy
such as direct (ex post) bribes or indirect ones, e.g. through a revolving door mechanism.
The agency specific utility (V( )) can also be negative or decreasing in the investment
level. For example, it is possible that some R&D projects exhibit negative externalities
while being privately profitable.
In V( ), iZ  is a vector of observable firm characteristics, which contains the same
elements as iX . In our case, iZ  includes also the two screening outcomes (discussed
next) that are observed by the agency and by the econometrician but not by the firm, i.e.
that are not part of iX . Note that V( ) includes also ih ,  which  constitutes  part  of  the
agency's type, defined as a random shock to the agency specific utility from project i. The
shock is assumed to be distributed by nature, uncorrelated with firm characteristics, and
unobserved by the econometrician. By A.1, ih  is  also  unobserved  by  the potential
applicant and observed by the agency (at the latest) after application and screening takes
place. In other words, A.1 means that the potential applicant is uncertain about how the
agency, after screening the project proposal, sees the project and its potential to generate
spillovers, consumer surplus, or private benefits to the agency's civil servants.
We assume that when deriving the optimal subsidy the agency screens - in line
with reality - the application and learns, besides hi, the two elements of Zi that are not in
Xi. The screening results in two grades on a Likert scale of 5 and we assume this to be
common knowledge. The resulting 25 grade combinations are modeled by a latent
10
regression framework. Denoting the latent value of grading dimension jÎ{c, m} for
application i by *ijw  and the observed value by wij, we get:
hwij =  if hjijiijh Tw mwzm £+=<-
*
1
(4) h = 1,…,5, -¥®0m , 11 =m , 22 =m ,…, ¥®5m
ijw ~ N(0, 1) jÎ{c, m}, 0),cov( =imic ww ,
where iT  is a vector of observable firm characteristics and jz  is parameter vector to be
estimated. We assume that the unobservables jiw ,  which  are  part  of  the  agency’s  type,
are normally distributed and uncorrelated both with each other and other unobservables
of the model. Equation (4) produces probabilities ctp  and
m
kp  of getting grades t and k in
the two grading dimensions c and m (which stand for technological challenge and market
risk, see the next section). In other words, ctp  and
m
kp  reflect the firm’s beliefs about the
agency's valuation in dimensions wc and wm.
In stage two, the agency chooses a subsidy level si, ],0[ ss Î  where 1£s , to
maximize its expected discounted utility from project i, taking (2) into account. To arrive
at an estimable model we need to specify the effect of Ri on V( ). We assume that
(5) ¶V/¶Ri = Zid+hi,
where d is  a  vector  of  parameters  to  be  estimated.  An implication  of  (5)  is  that V( ) is
proportional to R&D investment. This may be unrealistic but similar assumptions are
common in the literature on growth and R&D spillovers. We test this assumption below
and do not reject it.
By using the envelope theorem, (1), (2) and (5), the first-order condition for the
agency’s unconstrained problem can be written as
(6) si = 1-g+Zid+hi.
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We proceed under the assumption that (6) characterizes the maximum and verify later in
the proof of the Proposition that this indeed is the case. Equation (6) shows how the
agency's unconstrained decision rule is decreasing in the shadow cost of public funds, g.
It is independent of the firm's type, ?i, so that even if the agency did not know the private
shock to the marginal profitability of R&D, it would not matter. The optimal subsidy
depends  positively  on  the  shock  to  the  agency  specific  utility, hi. The minimum
constraint of s=0 binds for hi£hiºg-1-Zid and the maximum constraint of s  for
hi³ ih º s +g-1-Zid.
C. Stage one of the game: to apply or not
In stage one, a profit maximizing firm applies for a subsidy if the expected utility from
applying is at least as large as that from not applying. To calculate the benefits from
applying, the firm needs to calculate the expected profits given all the possible valuations
of the agency. To do this, the firm has to calculate the probabilities for a submitted
application to get particular grades in the two evaluation dimensions and the expected
valuation  of  the  agency  over  all  possible hi. Let )( ihf  define firm i's belief about the
agency's type in dimension h and  let )( ihF be the corresponding cumulative
distribution function. The next step is to calculate what will be the subsidy level
associated with each possible valuation.
The firm weights the costs of applying against the profit increase stemming from
these expected subsidies. We specify the application costs as
(7) Ki = exp(Yiq+?i)
where Yi is a vector of observable firm characteristics, q is  a vector of parameters to be
estimated and ?i is a random cost shock (the other part of the firm's type), distributed by
12
nature, uncorrelated with observable firm characteristics, observed by the firm, and
unobserved by the econometrician and the agency (again, the latter is immaterial).
Dropping the subscript i the applicant's decision rule can be written as
(8)
)0),0(()}),(()](1[
)()),,()),,,((()0),0(()({
5
1
5
1
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dktsktsRRpp
t k
m
k
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h
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h
h  .
The costs of applying are on the right hand side of (8). Besides the fixed costs, the firm
takes into account that it can execute the project without a subsidy (A.3), in which case
the project yields P(Ri(0),0). The expected benefits of applying are on the left hand side
where the summation is over the potential screening outcomes. The first term in the curly
brackets is the expected profit in case the application is rejected. The rejection occurs
when hi£hi, i.e. with probability F(hiºg-1-Zid).  The  second term is  the  expected  profit
when hiÎ(hi, ih )  in  which  case  the  firm receives  the  optimal  interior  subsidy  given  by
(6). The third term is the probability of receiving a maximal subsidy multiplied by the
profits with the maximal subsidy. This case occurs with probability
( )dh ii Zgs --+ºF- 11 .
D. Equilibrium of the game
We complete the model by showing that there is a unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
This ensures a meaningful econometric implementation of the model. Perfect Baysian
equilibria in our model consist of four components: 1) A firm's decision whether to apply
for a subsidy or not.  Let diÎ{0,1} denote firm i's application decision where di=1 if the
firm  applies  for  a  subsidy  and di=0 if the firm does not apply. 2) The firm's belief
functions ( )ict dp , ( )imk dp  and ),( ii dhf that  describe  a  (common)  assessment  of  how
the agency values the firm's project given di.  3)  The  agency's  subsidy  decision
13
si*(hi,ti,ki,di) which determines the level of subsidy granted to firm i given di and the
information revealed in the screening process. 4) The firm's optimal investment Ri*(si,di)
given si and di.
PROPOSITION. There is a unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium where di=1 if (8) holds,
si*(hi,ti,ki,di)  is  zero  for hi£hi,  is  given  by  (6)  for hiÎ(hi, ih )  and  is s  for hi ³ ih , and
Ri*(si,di) is given by (2).
Proof: For brevity of notation, we drop the subscript i and the arguments t, k, d. In stage
three, the firm has a well-defined best-reply function R*(s) given by (2). In stage two, the
agency maximizes its expected utility conditional on its type. There is a unique type-
contingent optimal subsidy if the second order condition for the agency's decision
problem holds. Since we have linear constrains of minimum and maximum subsidies, it
suffices to show that U(R*(s),s) is concave when evaluated at the interior solution given
by (6). Differentiating (3) twice shows that U(R*(s),s) is concave if
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From (1) and (4) we see that ¶2V/¶R2 and ¶2P/¶s2 are  zero.  Together  with  the
envelope theorem (¶P/¶R=0) they imply that (9) can be simplified to
02 2
22
2
22
<÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -
¶
¶
+÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
¶¶
P¶
+
¶
P¶
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ gs
R
V
ds
Rdg
sRds
dR
Rds
dR . Using (2) and (5) we get
( ) ( )
( )
( ) 0
1
21
1
2exp
1 22
2
<-+
-
+-
-
+÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
-
- gsZ
s
Rg
s
R
R
X
s
R
hd
eb , which using (2)
further simplifies to ( ) ( ) 0
1
2121
1
<úû
ù
êë
é
-
-+
+-+-
- s
gsZg
s
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expression at the interior solution given by (6) yields s-1<0. Consequently, there is a
unique maximum that solves the agency's decision problem. Because the optimal
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unconstrained subsidy (6) is increasing in h, s*(h)=0 for h£h, s*(h) is given by (6)
for hÎ(h,h ) and s*(h)= s  for h³h . Thus, the optimal type-contingent action of the
agency in stage two is unique. In stage one the firm decides whether to apply or not
given s*(h) and ctp ,
m
kp  and )(hf . Since in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the firm's
belief must be consistent with the agency's strategy, di=1 if (8) holds. Clearly, the
agency's best response to d=1 is s*(h)  so  we  have  found  a  Perfect  Bayesian
equilibrium. Since the utility maximizing action in each stage of the game is unique,
the equilibrium is also unique. ?
III. Finnish innovation policy, Tekes and data11
A. Innovation policy and Tekes
In 2001 Finland invested 3.6 per cent of GDP – 5 billion euros - on R&D. Tekes is the
principal public financier of private R&D in Finland.12 The primary objective of Tekes is
to promote the competitiveness of Finnish industry and the service sector by providing
funding and advice to both business and public R&D. To achieve these goals, Tekes
strives to increase Finnish firms’ R&D and risk-taking. Tekes is also responsible for
allocating funding from European Regional Development Funds (ERDF). Funding from
ERDF is subject to the general funding criteria of Tekes, but it is meant for least-favored
regions. As a result, Tekes funding has also a regional dimension through ERDF. Finnish
regions differ greatly in their socio-economic characters, economic performance, and
11 As our application data is from Jan. 2000- June 2002, we use 2001 figures to describe the environment. One
of  us  spent  nine  months  in  Tekes  to  get  acquainted  with  the  actual  decision  making process.  Among other
things  she  participated  in  the  decision  making  meetings.  Public  information  about  Tekes  can  be  found  at
http://www.tekes.fi/eng/, accessed December 20th, 2004.
12 Main public funding organizations in the Finnish innovation system in addition to Tekes are the Academy
of Finland, Employment and Economic Development Centers (T&E Centers), Finnvera,  Industry Investment
and Sitra. Also the Foundation of Finnish Inventions (Innofin) provides financial support for innovation. See
Georghiu et al. (2003) for a recent description and evaluation of the Finnish innovation policy institutions.
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their  R&D-intensity,  e.g.  some  20%  of  the  population  lives  in  the  capital  region  in
Southern Finland where also a large part of the economic activity and most of R&D takes
place.
Besides funding business R&D, Tekes finances feasibility studies, and R&D by
public sector including scientific research. In 2001 Tekes funding amounted to 387
million euros, and it received 2948 applications of which almost exactly 2/3 were
accepted. The number of applications by the business sector for R&D funding was 1357
and, again, 2/3 of them were accepted. In monetary terms, the business sector applied for
526 million euros while 211 million euros were granted to it.
Business R&D funding consists of grants, low-interest loans and capital loans.
Tekes’ low-interest loans not only have an interest rate below the market rate but they are
also soft: If the project turns out to be a commercial failure, the loan may not have to be
paid back. A capital loan granted by Tekes differs from the standard private sector debt
contract in various ways: it is included in fixed assets in the balance sheet, it can be paid
off only when unrestricted shareholders’ equity is positive and the debtor cannot give
collateral  for  the  loan.  The  share  of  each  instrument  of  the  total  funding  allocated  to
business R&D in 2001 was 69 %, 18% and 13 %. Subsidy applications covered 83 % of
the amount applied whereas in terms of granted amount subsidies’ share was 67%. The
overlook of loans by applicants suggests that they do not encounter significant financial
constrains, supporting our assumption A.4 (cf. footnote 9).
The  application  process  from the  submission  to  the  final  decision,  which  to  our
understanding is well known among potential applicants, proceeds along the lines of the
theory model of Section II. There are two things worth mentioning: First, an application
has to include the purpose and the budget of the R&D project for which Tekes funding is
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needed, and the applied amount of funding in euros. We utilize this below. Second, Tekes
screens the application and grades it in several dimensions using a 6-point Likert scale
from 0-5, not two, as we assume for simplicity. However, according to Tekes’ civil
servants, the most important dimensions in project evaluation concern the technological
challenge of the project and its market risk which are the dimensions we include.13 Tekes’
public decision criteria are: The project’s effect on the competitiveness of the applicant,
the technology to be developed, the resources reserved for the project, the collaboration
with other firms within the project, societal benefits, and the effect of Tekes' funding.
Tekes takes into account whether the application comes from an SME and, as mentioned
above, it also has a regional dimension through ERDF.
Tekes’ final decision is based on the proposed budget of the project before the
R&D investments are made, but the actual funding is only given ex post against the
incurred costs. Decision making is constrained by the rules preventing negative subsidies
and very large subsidies both in relative and absolute terms. In other words, a subsidy is
granted ex ante as a share of to-be-incurred R&D costs. There is an upper bound for this
share: If the firm fulfils the EU SME criterion, the upper bound is 0.6, otherwise 0.5.14
The actual funding then covers the promised share of incurred costs up to a specified euro
limit. The limit should allow the promised reimbursement of investment costs up to the
profit maximizing level but prevent Tekes from covering costs extraneous to the project
13 A loose translation of grades of technological challenge is 0 = ‘no technical challenge’, 1 = ‘technological
novelty only for the applicant’, 2 =’ technological novelty for the network or the region’, 3 = ‘national state-
of-the-art’, 4 = ‘demanding international level’, and 5 = ‘ international state-of-the-art’. For market risk, it is 0
= ‘no identifiable risk’, 1 = ‘small risk’, 2 = ‘considerable risk’, 3 = ‘big risk’, 4 = ‘very big risk’, and 5 =
‘unbearable risk’.
14 Given our data, it is unlikely that firms deliberately keep themselves below the EU SME boundary
requiring that a firm has less than 250 employees and has either sales less than 40 million euros or the balance
sheet less than 27 million euros. Most of the firms in our data are well below the boundary, as 95% them have
less than 110 employees, less than 14 million euros in sales, and a balance sheet of less than 11 million. As
the SME criterion also maintains that large firms can hold at most 25% of a SME’s equity and votes, it is
unlikely that many of the SMEs are subsidiaries of large firms. We thus consider the SME status of a firm
exogenous.
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proposal.15 In terms of our model, these practices amount to s =0, }6.0,5.0{Îs and a goal
of setting the euro limit at sR(s).
Tekes also sometimes adjusts a proposed budget, both down and up, when an
applicant, e.g. applies subsidies for costs that Tekes cannot cover. In practice an upward
adjustment is rare and in principle occurs only if a project significantly changes character
during the application process. Such upgrades can thus be taken as exogenous events that
cannot be manipulated by Tekes to overcome the institutional limits on its subsidy
allocation.
B. Data
Our data come from two sources. The project level data come from Tekes, containing all
applications to Tekes from January 1st 2000 to June 30th 2002. They consist of detailed
information on the project proposals and Tekes' decisions. The firm level data covering
originally 14 657 Finnish firms come from Asiakastieto Ltd, which is a for-profit
company collecting, standardizing, and selling firm specific quantitative information.16
Asiakastieto’s data are based on public registers and on information collected by
Asiakastieto itself. The data contain for example, firms’ official profit sheet and balance
sheet statements, and include all the firms who file their data in the public register or
submit the information to Asiakastieto. We use the 1999 cross section, i.e. all firm
characteristics are recorded earlier than the application data. The sample was drawn from
Asiakastieto’s registers in 2002 according to three criteria: i) the most recent financial
statement of the firm in the register is either from 2000 or 2001; ii) the firm is a
15 As mentioned in footnote 8, the euro limit alleviates the moral hazard problem. There are also other reasons
for the limit. Because Tekes has an annual operating budget, a practical decision rule is to cap the euro
amount using the proposed budget, as it is the best available information at the time the subsidy decision is
made. Tekes is also monitored both by the press and politicians. Tekes civil servants may want avoid the
accusations of granting larger subsidies than originally planned. At the same time, however, there may be a
desire to make the limit high enough to allow profit maximizing behavior of applicants.
16 More information about Asiakastieto can be found at http://www.asiakastieto.fi/en/, accessed June 20th,
2005.
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corporation; and iii) the industrial classification of the firm is manufacturing, ICT,
research and development, architectural and engineering and related technical
consultancy, or technical testing and analysis. Firms in these industries are most likely to
apply for funding from Tekes. After cleaning the data of firms with missing values, we
are left with 10 944 firms. These firms form a large proportion of the population of
potential applicants, and they constitute our sample of potential applicants.
Some 1000 firms from outside our sample filed applications to Tekes during the
observation period. There are three principal reasons for the exclusion of an applicant
from  our  sample:  1)  the  firm  did  not  exist  in  1999;  2)  the  firm  did  not  operate  in  the
industries from which the sample was formed; and 3) the firm was so small that it was not
obliged by law to send its balance and profit sheets to the official registry.
The  data  we  use  in  the  estimations  comprises  915  applications,  where  we  have
limited the count to one per firm by using the first application by each firm within our
observation period. 17 722 of these applications were accepted, i.e. received a positive
subsidy  share.  Table  1  displays  summary  statistics  of  our  explanatory  variables  for
potential applicants, and Table 2 conditions the statistics on the application decision and
success. As Table 1 shows, potential applicants are heterogenous. They are on average 12
years old with 35 employees. A very high proportion are SMEs according to the official
EU standard (cf. footnote 14). As explained, the SME criterion determines the upper
bound of the share of the R&D costs covered by Tekes, and we therefore need to take it
into account in our estimations. Sales per employee, a measure of value added, is 165 000
euros. Some 6% are exporters. 18
17 Several firms in our data had multiple applications during our observation period. The firms in our sample
account for roughly half of all applications.
18 The figure excludes firms with both exports and imports. We have repeated our estimations by including in
the “exporter” category all firms that report exports regardless of whether they report imports or not. The
results are qualitatively identical, and quantitatively close to those reported.
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[TABLE 1 HERE]
We also have information on two corporate governance variables. In some 14% of
potential applicants, the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Such an arrangement can,
on the one hand, improve the information flow between the board and the executive but,
on the other hand, weakens the board’s independence. The board of an average potential
applicant has four to five members. A larger board is costlier but is more likely to include
members with outside knowledge that may be useful either in conducting R&D (e.g.
choosing among competing projects, organizing management of current projects,
monitoring), or in the application process itself.
From Table 2 we see that applicants are larger than non-applicants and successful
applicants larger than rejected ones. The median number of employees for non-applicants
is  5,  for  applicants  26,  and  for  rejected  applicants  21.  The  applicants  also  tend  to  have
larger boards. Quite naturally, applicants have more previous applications on average
than non-applicants. The difference in both means and medians is 4.
Table 3 reports information about applications and Tekes' decisions. Some 21% of
applications are rejected. The proposed projects involve on average an investment of 630
000 euros; the rejected proposals are clearly smaller with a mean of 385 000 euros.
According to Tekes’ rating, the projects have on average a technical challenge of 2 (scale
0-5), and rejected proposals have on average a lower score of 1.5. The mean risk score is
also 2, and it is the same for successful and rejected applications (see the Appendix for
more information).
[TABLE 2 HERE]
As explained, Tekes grants low-interest and capital loans besides subsidies.
Because it is hard to calculate the value of such non-standard loans to the applicants, we
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pool the instruments. We thus define the subsidy per cent as the sum of all three forms of
financing, divided by accepted proposed investment. As some 60% of applicants only
apply for a subsidy, and over 80% are only granted a subsidy, this seems a reasonable
simplification. Measuring a subsidy in this way, 0.4% of applicants get the maximum
subsidy.19 Successful  applicants  receive  on  average  a  subsidy  that  covers  32%  of  the
R&D investment costs. We test the robustness of our results to the definition of a subsidy
by using only pure subsidies as the dependent variable in the Tekes decision rule.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
IV. The econometric model
A. The model
We now operationalize the model presented in Section II. Using (1), (2) and (7), and
taking logarithms on both sides, the application rule can be derived from (8) (again,
subscript i omitted) as
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In words, the application rule is given by an indicator function di that takes the value one
if firm i finds it profitable to apply for a subsidy. The investment equation can then be
rewritten, upon taking logarithms of (2), as
(11) iiiii sXsR eb +--= )1ln()(ln * ,
with observation *lnln iii RdR =  and the agency decision rule (6) as
(12) iii Zgs hd ++-= )1(
* ,
19 There is a cluster of firms right below the maximum subsidy: 1.9% of applicants get a subsidy which is less
than one percentage point below the maximum subsidy, and 2.5% get a subsidy less than 5 percentage points
below the maximum. At the lower end there is no such clustering: on the contrary, no firm gets a subsidy that
is less than 2.9%: however, 2.6% of applicants get a subsidy that is greater than 2.9% and less than 5% .
20 Note that we can take logarithms on the inequality since the term
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with observations 0=ii sd  if 0
* £is  and ssd ii =  if ssi ³
* . Our econometric model can
thus be summarized by the screening equations (4), the application equation (10), the
investment equation (11) and the Tekes decision rule (12).
B. Statistical assumptions, identification and estimation
We now explain our statistical assumptions, how identification takes place, and how we
estimate the model. Our econometric model contains five unobservables, jw , e, h and ? .
They are assumed to be uncorrelated with the observed applicant characteristics.
Estimating the model without imposing restrictions on the covariation of the
unobservables is in principle possible by using a simulation estimator. However,
assuming that h is uncorrelated with e and 0n  yields a large reduction in computational
cost, because then the Tekes decision rule (12) is no longer subject to a selection
problem. This means that estimation can be broken into three steps. Since our tests (see
below) indicate that we cannot reject the Null hypothesis of no correlation between ne -
and h , in estimating the model by (pseudo-) ML, we impose
A.7 a) 0)1( nern ++= , b) eh ^ , c) 0nh ^ , d) 0ne ^ , e) ew ^j , f) hw ^j , g)
0nw ^j , h) h ~ N(0,
2
hs ),  i) e ~ N(0,
2
es ),  j) 0n ~ N(0,
2
0n
s ).
In words, the unobservable (h) affecting the agency specific utility is uncorrelated
both with the unobservable (e) affecting the marginal profitability of the applicant’s
investment and with the unobservable (?) affecting the application cost. The screening
equation unobservables ( jw ) are uncorrelated with all other shocks. As A.7a) shows,
there is no restriction on the correlation between ? and e. A.7h)-j) may be relaxed when
we use semi-parametric estimation methods.
The first step is the estimation of the ordered probit the screening equations (4).
By using the estimates we can calculate the firms’ expected probability that a submitted
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application gets a particular grade in the two evaluation dimensions. Our assumption that
the unobservables are normally distributed allows us to identify the coefficients up to
scale.
The second step is to estimate the Tekes decision rule (12). In estimation we use
the actual values for the grades from the evaluation of each project. The Tekes decision
rule identifies d, i.e. the effect of observed applicant and project characteristics on the
agency specific utility derived from the project. If we impose A.7b) and A.7c), we can
estimate (12) using a double-hurdle Tobit model without correcting for selection. To test
whether A.7b) and c) hold, we estimate a sample selection double-hurdle Tobit and test
for the significance of the Mills ratio term. We also use an alternative, more flexible,
approach of nonparametrically estimating (12) by a two-limit version of Powell’s (1984)
CLAD estimator.
After estimating the agency’s screening equation and its decision rule, we
calculate the effect of subsidies on the applicant's expected profits, replacing the
unobservable parts in the application equation (10) with their estimated counterparts. In
step three we then estimate the application and investment equations (10) and (11) by
using both ML and a semi-parametric variant of the approach suggested by Das, Newey,
and Vella (2003, henceforth DNV).21
Our data contains information on the proposed R&D investments, not the realized
one. However, we can identify the parameters of the investment equation (11) by
estimating a slightly modified version of the equation. The model implies that an
applicant strictly prefers proposing a budget based on a maximum subsidy per cent over
proposing any smaller amount, and is indifferent between proposing that budget and any
21 Manski (1989) compares merits of the parametric and non-parametric approaches. Manski argues that,
although the nonparametric approach appears to be more flexible, it involves arbitrary exclusion restrictions.
Therefore it is not necessarily preferable over the parametric one.
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larger amount.22 Consequently, we will estimate (11) using data on proposed R&D
budgets by inserting s  into (11). As explained in section III.A Tekes sometimes adjusts a
proposed budget, e.g. when an applicant applies for subsidies for costs that Tekes cannot
cover. To take into account such applicants' mistakes that may inflate the proposed R&D
investments, we use the measure ‘accepted proposed investment’ as our dependent
variable  in  the  R&D equation.  We test  the  robustness  of  our  results  by  using  the  R&D
investment proposed by the applicant as an alternative dependent variable.
The application equation (10) allows us to identify how observed applicant
characteristics affect the fixed costs of application without having to resort to an
exclusion  restriction.  Our  theoretical  model  suggests  a  form  for  the  error  term  in  the
application equation and, as a result, we identify the correlation between in  and ie when
using  ML.  Moreover,  we  can  identify  the  variance  of  the  error  term  in  the  application
equation since following theory the coefficient of the summand
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 is constrained to unity.23
Our model implies that the applicant’s best-reply function, Ri(si), is increasing in
treatment and is heterogenous both with respect to observables and the unobservable
profitability shock. Correcting for selection bias by using the application equation (10),
we obtain consistent estimates of b that determine the effect of the observable applicant
characteristics on the marginal profitability of the R&D-investment. To obtain consistent
22 Too see this, recall first that the applicant does not know Tekes' type (A.1) and the subsidy share is bounded
above at s . As mentioned in Section III.A, there is also an euro limit to the ex post reimbursements which is
based on the proposed budget. Then, since ¶?/¶s>0 by (1), the applicant wants as high a subsidy as possible.
Therefore it proposes an optimal project based on the maximum subsidy share, R*( s ). Proposing anything
less  risks  foregoing  profits  in  case  where  the  actual  subsidy  turns  out  to  be  larger  and  the  applicant
subsequently reoptimizes because of the euro limit. On the other hand, the applicant would never want to
implement a project larger than R*( s ), and it is indifferent between announcing R*( s ) and any larger
budget, given the assumption that it cannot misappropriate the funds.
24
standard errors in the application and investment equations, we bootstrap the whole
model (4), (10)-(12) when using both ML and the semi-parametric estimator.
Note  also  what  we  cannot  identify.  In  (1)  we  are  unable  to  identify ip , the
applicant's reservation value, from the constant in Xi. Our cross section estimates are
however not affected by unobserved differences in the reservation value. Similarly, in
(12) we cannot identify separately g, the opportunity cost of government funds, and the
constant in d. Nor can we identify V( ), since (12) cannot be integrated to a unique
number. Given (5), however, a constant in V( ) would imply that a project generates
agency specific returns even when the R&D investment is zero. As this is an unappealing
scenario, we feel justified in assuming that there is no constant in V( ). We are also unable
to identify the agency’s screening costs (Fi-Ki). This will result in an upward bias in the
welfare calculations if these costs are significant. Finally, in the semi-parametric
estimation of the application and investment equations, the parameters of the application
cost function cannot be identified.
V. Estimation results
We include the following firm characteristics into all estimation equations: age, the log of
the  number  of  employees,  sales  per  employee,  an  SME dummy,  a  dummy for  a  parent
company, the number of previous applications, a dummy indicating if the CEO acts as the
chairman of the board, board size, and a dummy for exporters. We also include industry
and region dummies.24 In  the  reported  specifications,  we  use  a  slightly  different  set  of
explanatory variables in the screening equations and the Tekes decision rule on the one
23 This implication of our theoretical model cannot be tested. If we imposed the standard variance
normalization, the coefficient of the term would be nes -/1  instead of unity.
24 We divide Finland into five regions: Southern, Western, Eastern, Northern and Central Finland. Of these,
Eastern and Northern Finland are the least developed. We did try interactions between firm characteristics and
industry and region dummies.
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hand, and the application and investment equations on the other. For example, we include
the squares of the continuous variables only when reporting the estimations of the
investment and application equations.25 The results from the screening equations are
reported in the Appendix. We also have estimated the model (by ML) excluding the
observations in the 99th size (sales) percentile, with essentially identical results to those
reported. Other robustness checks will be taken up in the context of the appropriate
estimation.
A. The Tekes decision rule and agency specific returns
In Table 4 we report the estimation results concerning Tekes’ decision rule. Recall that
the coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal effects of R&D on agency specific
benefits. By using ML (column one) we find that the more challenging a project is
technically, the higher is its subsidy rate. A one point increase on the 5-point Likert scale
leads to a 10 percentage point increase in the subsidy rate. Market risk carries a negative
but insignificant (p-value 0.13) coefficient. Firm size obtains a positive and significant (at
10% level) coefficient. A possible interpretation is that in Tekes’ view, moving an
otherwise identical R&D project into a larger firm creates larger positive externalities,
e.g. through higher employee rents. As against Tekes' stated preference that allows a 10
percentage points higher level of maximum subsidy for SMEs, it is unsurprising that
SMEs  are  granted  a  higher  subsidy,  everything  else  equal:  The  difference  is  8.5
percentage points. The corporate governance variables and the number of previous
applications have no effect.
We relegate the details of the coefficients of industry dummies to the Appendix.
The only industry dummies with significant coefficients are food (p-value .000) and data
processing (p-value .081). Using metal manufacturing firms as a reference group, firms in
25 To speed up the computation of the bootstrap we used LR-tests to narrow the set of explanatory variables in
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the food industry received a substantially higher subsidy, of the order of 25 percentage
points, whereas data processing firms obtained subsidies that were 6.5 percentage points
lower. During our observation period, Tekes was actively seeking applications from the
food industry, which at least partially explains the findings concerning the industry.
Another finding left to the Appendix is that regional aspects seem to influence
Tekes' decision making: Firms in Eastern and Central Finland obtain subsidies that are 7-
10 percentage points higher than they would obtain if they were in Southern Finland.
That regional policy matters is, however, debatable, as the city of Oulu, which is located
in Central Finland is one of the R&D centers in Finland. Moreover, we find that firms in
the depressed and sparsely populated Northern Finland do not get higher subsidies. This
finding is perhaps not robust as only 2% of our sample firms come from Northern
Finland.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
The above results are obtained under the assumptions A.7b) and A.7c), which
maintain that the error in the Tekes decision rule uncorrelated with the errors in the
investment and application equations. To test these assumptions, we estimated a two
stage selection model. We first estimated a probit application equation26 and then re-
estimated  the  Tekes  decision  rule  by  inserting  the  Mills  ratio  into  it.  The  Mills  ratio
obtained small negative (less than 0.2 in absolute value) and imprecisely estimated
coefficients in all of the several specifications that we tried. This suggests that our
assumptions A.7b) and A.7c) of no correlation are reasonable. The economic significance
of the no-correlation finding is tied to the interpretation of V( ). As we will elaborate in
sections  VI.B and  VI.C,  if  one  is  willing  to  assume that V( ) captures social surplus, it
each equation. The second order terms were excluded from the screening equations and the Tekes decision
rule based on the LR-tests.
26 Naturally, the probit was run without the expected subsidy term, but with and without added interactions to
improve identification.
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will most likely consist of domestic spillovers between firms in Finland. With this
interpretation, the finding implies that project specific spillover shocks are unrelated to
project specific profitability shocks.
We also tested our assumption that V( ), the agency specific utility, is linear in
applicant investment as implied by (5). Were V( ) non-linear in the applicant’s
investment,  the  Tekes  decision  rule  would  contain  an  investment  term  (R)  or  its
interactions with observable applicant characteristics. After incorporating such terms into
the Tekes decision rule, we could not reject the Null of (joint) insignificance of the terms.
Again, the economic implications are tied to the interpretation of V( ). The result suggests
that the agency specific benefits from a project are linear in R&D.
We also estimated the Tekes decision rule by a two-limit version of Powell’s
(1984) CLAD estimator.27 This allows for nonparametric estimation of (two-limit)
censored regressions. As column two of Table 4 shows, the results are relatively close to
those obtained using Tobit ML. The only noteworthy differences are that with CLAD, the
rubber industry obtains a significant positive coefficient (approximately 0.008 in value,
compared  with  0.012  for  Tobit),  and  the  coefficient  of  Central  Finland  is  no  more
significant. There are some relatively large differences between the insignificant
coefficients, though.
Finally, to test whether measuring the subsidy per cent by summing subsidies,
low-interest  loans  and  capital  loans  affect  the  results,  we  estimated  the  two-limit  Tobit
using  only  subsidies,  excluding  the  loans.  Column three  reveals  that  our  results  are  not
driven by our definition of the dependent variable.28
27 The two-limit CLAD was estimated by using the following algorithm: we first estimated a LAD using all
379 observations, then excluded all observations with predicted values less than the minimum or more than
the maximum allowed, and re-estimated the LAD. This was repeated until convergence.
28 We also checked whether the definition of the dependent variable in the Tekes decision rule affects our
parameter estimates in the sample selection model (application and R&D investment). The R&D investment
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B. Cost of application function
In Table 5 we report the estimates of the application cost function (equation (7)).29 Age,
SME status, CEO being chairman, and parent company status have no statistically
significant effect, but firm size has a non-linear decreasing effect on application costs.
Sales per employee increase application costs. One interpretation is that firms producing
high value added products have complicated R&D projects based on soft information that
are laborious to write down. Another is that because the opportunity costs of the effort of
making and promoting an application are probably far greater than the direct monetary
costs of filling in and filing it, firms with high value current production have higher
opportunity costs of applying. The size of the board has a decreasing effect on application
costs. This may reflect the role of external knowledge in lowering application costs.
Exporters have lower costs, maybe because they are relatively more experienced in
dealing with government bureaucracy than non-exporting firms.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
The number of past applications has a nonlinear effect, first decreasing and then,
after 141 applications, increasing application costs. Increasing the number of past
applications from non-applicants’ median of zero to applicants’ median of two decreases
application costs by 35%. One prior application decreases costs by 20% and four by 58%.
It seems that learning by doing is going on. Given that our data is cross sectional,
however, it is possible that instead of being attributed to path-dependence, the results are
generated by unobserved heterogeneity.
equations’ parameters are virtually identical, as are most of the parameters of the application equation. All
parameters in the application equation are within one standard deviation of each other.
29 We only present results from the model where the log of accepted proposed investment was the dependent
variable  in  the  2nd stage investment equation as results using the log of proposed investment yielded
essentially identical results.
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C. Investment equation
Recall that our investment equation (10) identifies the effects of exogenous variables on
marginal profitability of R&D investment. In view of the received R&D literature, it is
likely that unobserved heterogeneity accounts for a substantial part of the marginal
profitability  of  R&D.  This  is  also  what  we  find,  as  Table  6  shows.  Firms  with  higher
value-added current production have higher marginal profitability of R&D whereas it
appears to be lower in firms with CEOs as chairmen. Other findings are not robust over
specifications. In column one where we report the results from the specification with the
quadratic terms the number of previous applications and being an exporter also carry
significant coefficients.30 In  the  specification  without  the  quadratic  terms,  we  find  that
larger firms, measured by the log of the number of employees, have higher marginal
profitability of R&D. Henderson and Cockburn (1996), the only other study known to us
that employs project level data, report a similar result.
To test the robustness of our results, we estimated the model using DNV’s semi-
parametric sample selection estimator. We imposed otherwise the structure of the ML
specification, but allowed the additively separable error terms to have an unknown
distributions. The results, presented in column three of Table 6, are in line with the ML
estimates: Most coefficients are within the ML 95% confidence intervals. This suggests
that our ML distributional assumptions are not biasing the parameter estimates. The
propensity score carries a negative coefficient as expected (significant at 12.5% level).
Following DNV we interpret that there is evidence in favor of normal disturbances,
because cross-validation (CV) suggests that no higher order terms of the propensity score
are needed. 31
30 Several industry and region dummies carried significant coefficients, too.
31 We used the same trimming and transformation DNV. The transformation gives exact sample selection
correction for Gaussian disturbances. The trimming explains the difference in the sample size compared to
ML estimations. We tried up to the 4th order terms for the variable capturing the effect of subsidies on
30
[TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE]
Finally, we estimated the investment equation using the R&D investment
proposed by the applicant as an alternative dependent variable. The results, presented in
column four, are close to those in column one.32 The  one  notable  difference  is  that  the
coefficient of the CEO as chairman variable, although close in value, is no longer
statistically significant. It thus seems that the definition of the dependent variable is not
driving the results.
D. Covariance structure
As  Table  7  shows,  we  are  able  to  identify  the  variances  of  all  error  terms,  and  the
covariance between the unobservables in the application and investment equations. The
coefficient determining the variance share of the unobservable of the investment equation
in the unobservable of the application cost function (equation (7)) obtains a value of 1.5.
Ceteris paribus, the higher the unobserved marginal profitability of the R&D project of a
firm, the less likely it is that the firm will submit an application. Similar to the finding
that sales per employee increase application costs, it could be that projects with higher
marginal profitability of R&D are more complicated involving tacit knowledge and are
therefore more difficult to describe in an application. Moreover, the application costs are
essentially opportunity costs, which should be higher for projects with higher marginal
profitability of R&D.
expected discounted profits in the 1st stage, and started from the ML specification. CV indicated that we
should include the subsidy-terms up to the 3rd order, but should not include interactions of the other
explanatory variables. In the 2nd stage, we kept the same specification as in ML, and experimented with
including up to the 4th order transformation of the propensity score (without interactions with explanatory
variables). Only the 1st order propensity score variable obtained a significant coefficient, and CV confirmed
that we only should use the 1st order propensity score. CV-values are reported in the Appendix. We used a
Gram-Schmidt ortho-normalization for the 3rd and 4th order terms in both stages.
32 The results using the restricted specification are close to those reported in column two.
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VI. Implications of the results
The structure of our model can be utilized to back out a number of figures that provide
insights into the efficiency of R&D investment and subsidies. In addition the estimated
model can be used to analyze the effects of application costs. We first report implications
about expected benefits and rates of return to R&D, then discuss our findings on
treatment effects and finally present implications about the application costs. We
conclude by characterizing the distribution of R&D benefits.
In  calculating  the  figures,  a  key  idea  is  to  exploit  the  information  on
unobservables that the covariance structure and the application equation yield. Since the
indicator function in (10) takes value one for applicants and zero for non-applicants, we
can condition the expected values of the unobservables on the value of the indicator
function. We base the calculations on results derived using the accepted proposed
investment as the dependent variables and report medians. All our figures refer to
expectations formed prior to the launch of a project. Consequently, when we talk about
profits, utility, welfare or rate of return, we always mean expected discounted ones. For
brevity, we drop the ‘expected discounted’ from the text. In order to analyze the
differences between the group of non-applicants and the group of applicants, we report all
the figures for both groups.
A. Profitability and the rate of return to R&D
Profitability of R&D and the rate of return to R&D indicate the efficiency or productivity
of R&D investments. According to our model, profits on the non-applicants' projects are
13 million euros whereas they are only 2.7 million euros on the applicants’ projects. In
addition we find that in the absence of subsidies, the applicants’ projects generate an
agency specific median utility of 68 000 euros, the corresponding utility from non-
applicants' projects being 319 000 euros. Applicants’ projects are thus privately and
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socially less valuable than those of non-applicants. However, the ratio of agency specific
to private median benefits is somewhat higher for applicants than non-applicants.
The estimated private returns to R&D investment are very high for applicants
(median  close  to  1000%),  and  even  higher  for  non-applicants.  Joint  returns  to  R&D
investment are appreciably higher, but the differences are dominated by the very high
private returns. The private returns may seem too high for comfort even keeping in mind
that these figures are based on firms’ plans rather than on realizations, but most of the
prior literature’s results also indicate very high returns. For example, Griliches (1964)
estimates a social return of 13$ on a dollar of R&D in agriculture, Mansfield et al. (1977)
report an average social rate of return of over 80% and Griliches (1998, pp. 67) reports
private rates of return in the interval [.03, 1.03]. More recently, Udry and Anagol (2006)
report returns of 300% for pineapple cultivation in Ghana and explain it by appealing to
unobserved returns to innovation and experimentation related to this relatively new (in
Ghana) crop.
The relative dominance of private returns is understandable, because Tekes and
the firms operate in a small open economy from which most of the consumer surplus and
spillovers flow abroad.33 If Tekes is maximizing domestic welfare, it should ignore those
effects, implying that private returns constitute a large part of joint returns. The
distribution of private and, hence, joint returns to R&D, is skewed (see Figure 1 for non-
applicants’ private returns w/o subsidies), confirming earlier results (Pakes 1986, Scherer
and Harhoff 2000).
 [FIGURE 1, TABLE 8 HERE]
33 The  literature  on  R&D,  geography  and  trade  (see  e.g.  Eaton  and  Kortum  2002)  finds  that  much  of  the
spillovers are international.
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B. Treatment effects
The literature on treatment effects emphasizes the effects of the treatment on the
treated. In our case this treatment effect is the effect of the subsidy on the profits of
subsidized applicants, i.e the change in profits due to subsidy. We call this the private
treatment effect. It is heterogenous across firms as it depends on both observable and
unobservable applicant characteristics. In addition to this standard treatment effect, our
approach allows the identification of several other relevant treatment effects.
First, our model suggests that a subsidy has an effect on the agency beyond that
on the applicant. We name the subsidy-induced change in the agency specific utility the
subsidy the agency treatment effect.34 If one assumes that the agency is a benevolent
social planner, V( ) will capture all general equilibrium effects of a treatment outside
those appropriated by the applicant. Consequently the joint effect of the treatment on the
agency and the subsidized applicant will constitute the social treatment effect, i.e.,
increase in joint welfare due to the subsidy.
Second, the inclusion of application costs in the analysis makes it possible to
differentiate between gross and net effects of the treatment. Usually only gross treatment
effects, i.e. those that do not take into account application costs, are analyzed. Third, in
addition to the actual treatment effect35 (treatment on the treated), we can calculate the
expected  treatment  effect  on  the  applicants  and  the  non-applicants.  In  other  words,  our
model makes it possible to touch upon the issue of what would have been the effect of the
treatment on the non-applicants.
34 The calculations are based on the assumption that the shadow cost of taxes, g, is 1.2. Kuismanen (2000)
estimates the dead-weight loss of existing Finnish taxation to be 15% using labor supply models. Both the
constant of integration and the fixed costs of screening applications (i.e. Fi=Ki) are ignored.
35 In other words, actual means that the treatment is realized. Naturally, these are still expected discounted
effects.
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In  reporting  the  figures,  we  thus  divide  the  treatment  effects  into  private  (firm),
agency,  and  joint  treatment  effects.  Joint  refers  to  the  sum  of  private  and  agency
treatment effects. Note that all these treatment effects are expected, not realized, ones as
our calculations reflect the expected effect of the treatment prior the launch of the project.
The difference between treatment effect and expected treatment effect in the text is that
the former is calculated based on the actual, the latter using the anticipated, subsidy.
We  first  report  the  net  treatment  effects  based  on  actual  treatments  on  the
subsidized applicants. In the text below, we always refer to net figures unless otherwise
stated. The median increase in the subsidized applicants’ profits due to subsidies is 30
000 euros whereas the median agency treatment effect is 44 000 euros. Together these
generate the median joint treatment effect (welfare increase) of 74 000 euros. The median
increase in the subsidized applicants’ profits ignoring the application costs is 65 000
euros. Thus, ignoring application costs severely biases the estimated effects upwards.
The median joint rate of return on the subsidy is 0.80; ignoring application costs
the corresponding figure is 1.22.36 The joint rate of return on the subsidy program is 0.74,
taking  into  account  also  the  application  costs  of  the  applicants  that  did  not  receive  a
subsidy.37 Ignoring application costs yields a joint rate of return on the subsidy program
of 1.22. Note that the rates of return taking into account application costs are smaller than
the estimate we use for the shadow cost of public funds (g=1.2), meaning that costs
overweigh the benefits. We next compare the expected treatment effects for the non-
applicants and the applicants using expected subsidies.
The median increase in the applicants’ and non-applicants' profits due to expected
subsidies are 11 000 euros and -1.9 million euros respectively. The corresponding figures
36 The joint rate of return is defined as the sum of agency specific utility and firm profits net of application
cost divided by subsidy amount in euros, where the subsidy amount in euros equals subsidy times the
expected R&D investment, conditional on the subsidy.
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for gross profits are 46 000 euros vs. 206 000 euros. This highlights how the high
application costs make it unprofitable for the non-applicants to apply. To make the
comparisons between non-applicants and applicants more meaningful, we ignore the
applications costs below. As indicated above, the median increase in the applicants’ gross
profits due to expected subsidies is substantially less than the median increase in the non-
applicants’ profits ( 46 000 euros vs. 206 000 euros). A comparison of the figures with
the private returns without subsidies, however, shows that the relative increase is higher
for applicants than non-applicants. The non-applicants' projects also generate higher
median increase in the agency specific utility than the applicants' projects (77 000 euros
and 19 000 euros respectively). Figure 2 displays the distribution of the gross treatment
effect for both applicants (left graph) and non-applicants (right graph) using expected
subsidies as the treatment. It is evident that non-applicants’ treatment effects are larger on
average and that there is substantial heterogeneity.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
We have also calculated rates of return on expected subsidies, again ignoring
application costs. The rates of return in case of subsidized applicants are higher with
expected  subsidies  than  with  actual  ones,  because  some  applicants  who  would  have
generated very high returns if they had received expected subsidies, received lower
subsidies and therefore generate lower returns. The rate of return on the subsidy program
using  the  expected  subsidy  is  1.39  for  applicants  and  the  same  for  non-applicants.  The
median joint rate of return on expected subsidy is 1.38 for applicants and 1.37 for non-
applicants.
The private and agency, and therefore, joint expected treatment effects are
substantially lower for applicants, while the joint rates of return are similar for applicants
37 The joint rate of return on the subsidy program is the overall benefits due to subsidies divided by the
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and  non-applicants.  The  reason  why  applicants’  projects  are  submitted  to  Tekes  is  that
they involve much lower application costs than the projects that are not submitted. The
median costs of application is 34 000 euros for applicants compared to 2 million euros for
non-applicants. This is generated by the positive correlation between the shock to the
marginal profitability of R&D and the application cost shock. Some privately and jointly
profitable projects thus have very high private opportunity costs of applying.
C. Distribution of returns
In the following we assume that V(  )  reflects  returns  to  the  Finnish  society  that  are  not
appropriated by the firm. It is of course questionable whether Tekes’ decisions reflect
social  returns  or  not.  However,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  let  us  proceed  under  that
assumption. As mentioned, even if this is the case, V( ) does not measure the global social
surplus: it is very likely that most of the consumer surplus and at least some of the
spillovers stemming from Finnish innovations will diffuse outside Finland. Therefore,
one can think that V( ) mainly consists of domestic technological spillovers. This
interpretation is supported by our observation that technical challenge ratings gain a
significant role in the Tekes decision rule.
We first discuss how agency specific returns vary with R&D investments. This
immediately yields the variation of the agency specific returns with subsidies, given the
complementarity of the investment and subsidy levels in our model. We then describe
and characterize the joint distribution of private and agency specific benefits from R&D.
Much of the growth and R&D spillover literatures assume that spillovers are increasing in
R&D:  Studying  the  distribution  of  agency  specific  returns  allows  us  to  test  this
assumption in our data. The joint distribution in turn is central in uncovering whether the
social returns of R&D grow in proportion to private returns or not.
overall costs of subsidies, ignoring the shadow cost of taxes.
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Recall that we can estimate the profits from a firm's R&D project conditional on
its decision to apply for a subsidy (E[?( )|X, d]), and the agency specific utility from the
project (E[V]=E[ dˆZ ]E[R]). As before, in calculating E[ dˆZ ], we set g=1.2 and Fi=Ki,
yielding -0.14 as our estimate of the constant. Using this value, E[ dˆZ ] is nonnegative for
97% of our observations: Figure 3 depicts the distribution of E[ dˆZ ]. This implies that
E[V( )] is increasing in R&D investments and, hence, in the subsidy rate, for almost all
projects in our data. The figure also reveals that for most projects, the expected increase
in spillovers is between 0.25 and 0.5 per one euro of R&D. For 99% of firms, a one euro
increase in R&D leads to a less than 0.7 euro increase in spillovers.38
[FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE]
Figure 4 presents the joint distribution of private and agency specific returns, and
a non-parametric estimate of E[V( )] as a function of E[?( )|X, d].39 Regressing E[V( )] on
E[?( )|X, d] and a constant yields a highly significant coefficient of 0.022, while the raw
correlation is 0.875 and significant at the 1% level. The estimated nonparametric
relationship between the agency specific and private returns seems to be almost linear for
most of the interval.
VII. Conclusions
We develop a new approach to characterize the determinants and the distribution of R&D
returns, to measure treatment effects and to improve our understanding of how an R&D
subsidy program works. The method exploits a structural treatment program model and
firm  and  R&D  project  level  data.  We  find  that  spillover  and  profitability  shocks  are
unrelated and spillovers are linear in R&D investments. The returns appropriated by the
38 We trimmed the sample used in Figure 3 at the 99th percentile.
39 We have trimmed the sample at the 95th percentile to aid the visualization of the distribution. The estimate
is a k-nearest neighbor estimate.
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agency but not by the firm are dominated by private returns. Both private and social rates
of return to R&D investment are large and their distribution skew. Large firms’ projects
yield higher agency specific returns. Profitability and application cost shocks are
positively related, implying that firms do not apply for subsidies for the privately most
profitable projects.
On  the  treatment  effect  side  we  are  able  to  extend  the  number  of  identified
treatment effects. We find considerable heterogeneity in all of them, generated both
through observables and unobservables. We also compare the expected effects of
subsidies between non-applicants and applicants had the non-applicants and the
applicants been granted the anticipated subsidy. The findings indicate that both the
private and the agency treatment effects are substantially lower for applicants, while the
expected joint rates of return are similar for applicants and non-applicants. In general, our
results suggest that ignoring application costs is recommendable neither in the research of
R&D subsidy treatment effects nor in practical policy making, as it leads to a significant
upward bias. For example, the median increase in the subsidized applicants’ profits due to
subsidies is 30 000€, while the corresponding figure ignoring application costs is 65
000€.
39
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.d. Min. Max.
Age, years 12.320 9.3453 1 97
# Employees 35.229 257.174 1 13451
Sales/employee, 1000 euros 164.920 2156.961 0 206875.5
Exporter 0.063 0.244 0 1
SME 0.975 0.157 0 1
CEO is chairman of board 0.141 0.348 0 1
Board size 4.350 2.003 1 10
# past Tekes applications 0.575 3.488 0 146
Applicant 0.084 0.277 0 1
NOTES: There are 10944 observations. Data sources: Asiakastieto Ltd. otherwise; for data on
applications, Tekes.
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Table 2
Conditional Descriptive Statistics
 Non-Applicants Applicants Rejected
Applicants
Successful
Applicants
Age 12.355
(9.326)
[10]
11.940
(9.557)
[10]
11.777
(9.964)
[9]
11.983
(9.452)
[10]
#
Employees
21.200
(122.282)
[5]
189.001
(775.862)
[26]
101.269
(187.503)
[21]
212.453
(866.674)
[27]
Sales/empl
oyee
168.852
(2252.692)
[77.55]
121.826
(54.996)
[89.72]
104.831
(94.238)
[82.95]
126.369
(167.307)
[91.58]
Exporter 0.059
(0.236)
0.109
(0.312)
0.119
(0.325)
0.107
(0.309)
SME 0.9860
(0.1173)
0.850
(0.357)
0.855
(0.352)
0.849
(0.358)
CEO is
chairman
of board
0.141
(0.348)
0.149
(0.356)
0.176
(0.382)
0.141
(0.349)
Board size 4.183
(1.873)
[4]
6.177
(2.431)
[6]
5.850
(2.285)
[5]
6.265
(2.462)
[6]
# past
Tekes
application
s
0.247
(1.283)
[0]
4.163
(10.657)
[2]
3.228
(10.933)
[1]
4.413
(10.576)
[2]
Nobs. 10029 915 193 722
NOTES: Number reported are mean, (standard deviation), and for other than
[0,1] variables, [median]. Data sources: Asiakastieto Ltd. otherwise; for data on
applications, Tekes.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Tekes and Application Variables
All
Applicants
Successful
Applicant
s
Rejected
Applicants
Applied
amount,
euros
634294
(1254977)
700378.2
(1363460)
385790
(657539.8)
Applied for
subsidy only
0.591
(0.492)
0.482
(0.500)
1.000
(0.000)
Technical
challenge
2.088
(0.982)
{582}
2.312
(0.872)
{426}
1.474
(1.006)
{156}
Risk 2.189
(0.937)
{422}
2.150
(0.925)
{326}
2.302
(0.937)
{96}
Granted
subsidy rate
- 0.316
(0.126)
-
Granted
subsidy only
- 0.839
(0.600)
-
Nobs. 915 722 193
NOTES: Datasource: Tekes. Reported numbers are mean, standard deviation, and
{nobs}, the last in case it deviates from that reported on the last row.
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Table 4
Tekes Decision Rule Results
Variable (1)
ML
Dep. var. subsidy-intensity
(all finance)
(2)
CLAD
Dep. var. subsidy-intensity.
(all finance)
(3)
ML
Dep. var. subsidy-intensity
(subsidies only)
Risk -.018
[-.041    .005]
-.020**
[-.039   -.001]
-.019
[-.048    .009]
Technical
challenge
.100***
[.076    .124]
.094***
[.074    .113]
.120**
[.090    .150]
Age -.001
[-.003     .001]
.0003
[-.0017    .0023]
-.001
[-.004    .002]
Log
employment
.0164*
[-.003    .036]
.024***
[.008    .040]
.031***
[.007    .055]
Sales /
employment
.000036
[-.000136    .000276]
.000034
[-.000083    .000151]
.000036
[-.00017    .000243]
SME .085*
[-.001    .170]
.068*
[-.003    .138]
.093*
[-.011    .197]
Parent company .006
[-.040    .053]
.016
[-.023    .055]
.014
[-.043    .070]
# previous
applications
-.001
[-.006    .004]
-.002
[-.006    .002]
-.003
[-.009     .003]
CEO also
chairman
.001
[-.053   .055]
-.018
[-.064    .028]
-.013
[-.080    .055]
Board size -.007
[-.017    .003]
-.0001
[-.0084    .0082]
-.009
[-.021    .003]
Exporter -.042
[-.107     .023]
-.016
[-.069    .038]
-.079*
[-.161    .002]
Constant -.060
[-.217    .098]
-.103
[-.233    .028]
-.197**
[-.393   -.001]
hs .189***[.173    .206]
- .225***
[.203    .247]
Nobs. 379 379 379
LogL. -18.636 - -91.763
Wald 0.000 - 0.000
Linearity 1 0.690 - -
Linearity 2 0.313 - -
Sample sel. .068
(.051)
- -
NOTES:  Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Wald is the p-value of a Wald test of joint significance of
all RHS variables. All specifications include industry and region dummies.
Linearity 1 = the p-value of a LR-test of including the proposed R&D investment into the equation.
Linearity 2 = the p-value of a LR-test of including the proposed R&D investment into the equation, plus interactions between it and
age, log employment, and sales/employee.
Sample sel. =  coeff. and (s.e.) of the Mills ratio term when the 1(apply) specification same as in Table 5.
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the proportion of expenses that the Agency covers, defined as the sum of all three
types of financing the Agency grants (in euros, see main text) divided by accepted proposed investment. In column (3), the dependent variable
is the subsidy (in euros) divided by the accepted proposed investment.
47
Table 5
Application Cost Function Results
Variable Value
Age .008
[-.015   .630]
Age sq. 4.413e-05
[-.006    .0004]
Log of employment -.293**
[-15.151    -.014]
Ln(emp) sq. .040**
[.008    1.497]
Sales/employee .002*
[-.0003   .014]
Sales/emp. Sq. -1.974e-0.7
[-8.11e-07   3.69e-06]
SME .093
[-2.334   3.488]
Parent company -.085
[-6.661    .128]
# Previous applications -.171***
[-6.606    -.078]
# Prev appl. sq. .001***
[.0006   .051]
CEO is chairman -.285
[-1.550   .409]
Board size -.075**
[-3.032   -.008]
Exporter -.598**
[-10.405   -.090]
Constant 13.110***
[11.156   100.589]
Nobs 10751
LogL. -18.636
Wald (d.f. 29) 0.000
NOTES:  Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Statistics refer to the probit
1st stage regression from the results of which the cost function coefficients have been backed out.
Confidence intervals are estimated using a bootstrap with 400 repetitions. The specification includes
industry and regional dummies.
Wald is the p-value of the joint significance of all explanatory variables in the probit 1st stage
regression.
***, **, *, and a denote that the whole 99%, 95%, 90% and 85% confidence interval has the same sign
as the coefficient estimate.
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Table 6
R&D Investment Function Results
Variable (1)
ML
Dep. var. accepted
proposed investment
(2)
ML
Dep. var. accepted
proposed investment
(3)
DNV
Dep. var. accepted
proposed investment
(4)
ML
Dep. var.
proposed investment
Age -.005
[-.025   .012]
.002
[-.007   .007]
.0001
[-.030  .025]
-.005
[ -.027   .006  ]
Age sq. .0002
[-.00008   .0005]
- .0002
[-.0002   .0005]
.0001
[-.00008   .0004]
Log of
employment
-.077
[-.226  .132]
.041**
[.014   .159]
-.024
[-.362   .327]
-.130
[-.268   .206]
Ln(emp) sq. .015
[-.021   .038]
- -.001
[-.039   .036]
.022
[-.017   .040]
Sales/empl. .001**
[.00002     .002]
0.0009***
[.0005   .002]
.001**
[.0003   .003]
.001*
[-.00003   .002]
Sales/emp.
sq.
-1.95e-07
[-7.74e-07 1.28e-06]
- -2.9e-07
[-1.01e-06 1.33e-06]
-1.53e-07
[-6.27e-07 1.66e-06]
SME -.258
[-.726    .166]
-.280
[-.523   .096]
-.011
[-.766   .815]
-.063
[-.511   .349]
Parent
company
.020
[-.166   .208]
.064
[-.072   .271]
-.091
[-.438   .236]
-.035
[-.183   .182]
# Previous
applications
-.047**
[-.082   -.013]
-.007
[-.018  .004]
-.295
[-.748  .174]
-.047a
[-.070   .006]
# Prev appl.
sq.
.0003**
[.0001   .0013]
- .002
[-.005   .011]
.0003
[-.0001   .0007]
CEO is
chairman
-.182*
[-.354    .022]
-.194**
[-.366   -.011]
-.158
[-.368   .066]
-.107
[-.290   .100]
Board size -.008
[-.038    .036]
.008
[-.015  .056]
-.065
[-.207   .086]
.007
[-.020   .063]
Exporter -.255*
[-.455    .0029]
-.199
[-.355  .047]
-.398
[-.849   .162]
-.118
[-.258   .173]
Propensity
score
- - -13.363a
[-28.604   3.440]
-
Constant 13.234***
[11.909    14.123]
12.416***
[10.950  12.734]
- 13.002***
[10.923   13.536]
Nobs. 722 722 688 914
Wald (d.f. X) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(1- s ) 0.158
(0.181)
-0.718
(0.740)
NOTES: Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Confidence intervals are based on a bootstrap with 400
repetitions. In columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is the log of accepted proposed investment: in column (4) it is the log of proposed
investment.
Wald is the p-value of joint significance of RHS variables. The constant is not identified when using DNV.
 ln(1- s ) coefficient reports the coefficient and the (p-value) of a 2c -test of difference from unity. The SME dummy was excluded from
the test regressions due to collinearity with ln(1- s ).
***, **, *, and a denote that the whole 99%, 95%, 90% and 85% confidence interval has the same sign as the coefficient estimate.
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Table 7
Covariance Structure Results
Variable Value
es
Standard deviation of the investment
equation  shock
1.120***
[.834   1.256]
hs
Standard deviation of the Tekes specific
utility (=V( )) shock
.189***
[.173    .206]
0us
Standard deviation of the uncorrelated
part of the application cost function shock
.456***
[.111   12.552]
1+ r
Measure of the variance share of e  in u
1.485***
[1.052   11.010]
eur
Correlation between e  and the
application equation error term
-.766***
[-.879   -.153]
NOTES:  Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. For all but hs , these are
based on a bootstrap with 400 repetitions. For hs , it is based on the estimated covariance matrix.
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.
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Figure 1: Distribution of expected discounted profits of non-applicants (with no subsidies).
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Figure 2: Distribution of the treatment effect for applicants (left graph) and non-applicants
using expected subsidies as the treatment.
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subsidies, all firms.
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APPENDIX A
In this Appendix, we report the ordered probit estimation of the Tekes grading
process; descriptive statistics of a) the whole application sample b) the application
sample who have strictly positive accepted proposed investments, and c) the
application sample for which we observe grades in both evaluation dimensions;
industry and region dummy descriptive statistics and their coefficients for the
estimated equations; and the cross-validation figures for the 1st and  2nd stage DNV
estimations.
We have different applicant samples in the estimations of the two grading
dimensions, because sometimes we only observe one or the other grade for an
application. During our observation period, Tekes did not uniformly store grading
data in their central database, from which our data has been collected. We use the
estimation results to create the probabilities of getting a particular grade for all the
10751 (10944) observations in the estimation sample.
A.1. The evaluation equations
In the technical challenge estimation, sales per employee, number of previous
applications, board size, and industry dummies (chemical, industry, electric
engineering, data processing, and R&D services) increase the probability of getting a
high grade in evaluation of technical challenge. Having a CEO as chairman and being
in the food or paper industry decreases the probability of getting a high grade.
In the market risk estimation, sales per employee and a number of industry
dummies have a negative effect on the probability of obtaining a high risk rating (high
meaning higher risk). The industry dummies that carry significant negative
coefficients are paper, other manufacturing, and telecoms. Being located in Western
Finland also decreases the probability of being classified as high risk.
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Table A.1
Estimation of the Evaluation Equations
Variable Technical Challenge Risk
Age |   .003
[-.007     .013]
|  -.0042379
[-.0164625   .0079868]
Log Employees .008
[-.076    .092]
-.0536393
[-.1538962   .0466177]
Sales/employee .001***
[.0002    .002]
-.0008665*
[-.0017846   .0000516]
SME -.101
[-.476    .274]
|   .0600485
[-.3851782   .5052751]
Parent Company -.002
[ -.206    .202]
|  -.1378355
[-.3769572   .1012863]
# Previous
Applications
.021*
[ -.003    .044]
-.0189169
[-.045992   .0081582]
CEO is chairman |  -.247**
[-.487   -.006]
-.0118448
[-.2940517   .270362]
Board size .078
[.034    .121]
.0331881
[ -.0160126   .0823889]
Exporter |   .170
[-.114    .454]
.2292716
[-.1084814   .5670247]
Nobs. 582 422
LogL. -753.92882 -528.7958
Joint Significance 0.000 0.0000
NOTES: reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Joint Significance is
the p-value of a LR test of joint significance of all explanatory variables. Both specifications include
industry and region dummies.
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.
A.2. Descriptive statistics of the applicant samples
Table A.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the three samples of applicants
mentioned above. As can be seen, the differences are minor; judging on observables,
we are unlikely to have a selection problem among applicants in the subsidy equation.
The only potentially worrisome difference is that in the smallest sample, the mean
number of previous application is lower (2.8) than in the other two (4.2 and 4.4). The
standard error also declines. Also, the proportion of telecom firms and firms in
Eastern Finland are somewhat lower. As we report in the main text, we found no
evidence for sample selection after testing it against the whole sample.
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Table A.2
Descriptive Statistics of Different Applicant Samples
Variable All Applicants Applicants with strictly
positive proposed
accepted investment
Applicants for whom
grades in both evaluation
dimensions are observed
Age 11.940
( 9.557)
11.983
(9.452)
11.425
(8.961)
Log Employees 3.416
(1.787)
3.469
(1.786)
3.213
(1.684)
Sales/employee 121.826
(154.996)
126.369
(167.307)
120.252
(128.096)
SME .850
(.357)
.849
(.358)
.879
(.327)
Parent company .510
(.500)
.525
(.500)
.478
(.500)
# Previous applications 4.163
(10.657)
4.413
(10.576)
2.765
(4.545)
CEO is chairman .149
(.356)
.141
(.349)
.174
( .380)
Board size 6.177
(2.431)
6.265
(2.462)
6.090
(2.367)
Exporter .109
(.312)
.107
( .309)
.116
(.321)
Food .035
( .184)
.037
(190)
.032
(.175)
Paper .051
(.221)
.051
(.221)
.037
(.189)
Chemicals .032
(.175)
.035
(.183)
.026
(.160)
Rubber .062
(.242)
.061
(.239)
.061
(.239)
Metals .079
(.269)
.080
(.272)
.069
(.253)
Electric .101
(.301)
.108
(.311)
.106
(.308)
Radio and TV .040
(.197)
.039
(.193)
.047
( .213)
Other manufacturing .093
(.290)
.091
(.288)
.087
(.282)
Telecoms .009
(.093)
.010
(.098)
.003
(.051)
Data processing .207
(.405)
.197
(.398)
.259
(.438)
R&D .148
(.355)
.147
(.354)
.129
( .336)
Western Finland .321
( .467)
.321
(.467)
.351
(.478)
Eastern Finland .115
(.319)
.125
(.331)
.058
(.234)
Central Finland/   Oulu
region
.085
(.279)
.079
(.270)
.087
(.282)
Northern Finland /
Lapland region
.022
(.146)
.019
(.138)
.029
(.168)
Nobs. 915 722 379
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A.3. Descriptive statistics of the industry and region dummies for the whole
sample
Table A.3
Descriptive Statistics of the Industry and Region Dummies for the Whole Sample
Indicator Mean (s.d.)
Agriculture .0001
(.010)
Food .045
( .207)
Paper .061
(.239)
Chemicals .015
(.120)
Rubber .056
(.229)
Metals .139
(.346)
Electric .046
(.209)
Radio and TV .015
(.120)
Other manufacturing .188
(.391)
Telecoms .009
(.095)
Data processing .105
(.307)
R&D .196
(.397)
Southern Finland .453
(.498)
Western Finland .386
(.487)
Eastern Finland .078
(.268)
Central Finland/Oulu region .061
(.240)
Northern Finland/Lapland .023
(.149)
NOTES: there are 10944 observations.
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A.4. Coefficients of industry and region dummies
Table A.4
Estimated Industry and Region Dummy Parameters
Variable  Tekes Decision Rule
Table 4
Application Cost
Function
Table 5
 R&D Investment Function
Table 6
Column (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Food .246***
[.122 .370]
.241***
[.137  .345]
.312***
[.163 .461]
.045
[-1.593   3.204]
-.649***
[-1.012   -.265]
-.612***
[-1.00   -.269]
-.518*
[-.968   .025]
-.522***
[-.884   -.155]
Paper -.017
[-.140 .106]
.018
[-.080 .116]
.0003
[-.1488  .1494]
.070
[-0.632   10.919]
.034
[-.354   .364]
.017
[-.350   .343]
.144
[-.395   .808]
.183
[-.203   .482]
Chemicals .094
[-.039 .228]
.052
[-.060  .164]
.132
[.029 .292]
.759
[-10.372   1.601]
.213
[-.253   .744]
.264
[-.162   .752]
.232
[-.573   .889]
.163
[-.320  .723]
Rubber .012
[-.084 .108]
.080
[-.002  .162]
.008*
[-.111 .126]
.191
[-.479   5.275]
.099
[-.228   .406]
.103
[-.213   .407]
.109
[-.214   .542]
.080
[-.254   .420]
Metals .004
[-.089   .095]
.013
[-.063    .089]
-.014
[-.128 .100]
.335a
[-.142   8.231]
.248*
[-.030   .499]
.231a
[-.067   .472]
.289
[-.127   .708]
.403**
[.023    .637]
Electric -.046
[-.128 .036]
-.006
[-.076 .063]
-.052
[-.153 .050]
-.105
[-13.195  .360]
.111
[-.178   .458]
.167*
[-.030   .540]
-.078
[-.678   .593]
.254**
[.036    .641]
Radio and TV -.029
[-.137  .078]
.011
[-.077 .100]
-.001
[-.131 .128]
.508
[-5.121   1.552]
.594***
[.191   1.177]
.621***
[.247   1.183]
.486*
[-.066   1.287]
.603**
[.126   1.223]
Other manufacturing -.019
[-.107 .069]
.013
[-.060 .086]
-.016
[-.123 .092]
.204
[-.332   9.556]
.014
[-.280   .299]
-.045
[-.379   .217]
.0002
[-.391   .460]
.205
[-.185   .433]
Telecoms - - - .920*
[-.055   14.543]
.580*
[-.072    1.262]
.520*
[-.084   1.08]
.888*
[-.221  2.095]
.602
[-.101   1.226]
Data processing -.066*
[-.140 .008]
-.028
[-.090 .033]
-.058
[-.150 .034]
-.285
[-17.328   .245]
.079
[-.162  .390]
.174*
[-.029   .484]
-.199
[-.917   .552]
.210**
[.027  .605]
R&D .007
[-.073    .087]
.049
[-.018 .117]
.024
[-.075 .122]
.111
[-.998   1.739]
.-0.52
[-.340   .224]
-.074
[-.286   .226]
-.071
[-.353   .251]
.096
[-.184  .367]
Western Finland .018
[-.028   .064]
.026
[-.012  .065]
.019
[-.038 .075]
.304
[-.802  .770]
.160**
[.013    .342]
.151**
[.012   .328]
.147*
[-.011  .321]
.236***
[.079   .418]
Eastern Finland .096**
[.007    .185]
.088**
[.014  .162]
.145***
[.037 .252]
-.262a
[-11.514   .172]
-.427***
[-.644   -.128]
-.374***
[-.548   -.059]
.539**
[-.980   -.030]
-.462***
[-.622   -.094]
Central Finland/Oulu region .069*
[-.006    .145]
.031
[-.030 .092]
.102**
[.010 .193]
.052
[-5.856   .547]
-.057
[-.291   .261]
-.033
[-.246   .255]
-.175
[-.600    .242]
.062
[-.175   .369]
Northern Finland/Lapland -.031
[-.158    .095]
-.026
[-.121 .070]
-.014
[-.170 .142]
.194
[-2.989  2.085]
.257
[-.095   .715]
.280a
[-.027   .715]
.245
[-.188   .702]
.096
[-.190   .507]
NOTES: in the Tekes decision rule equations, we excluded the telecommunications dummy because of problems in the bootstrap that were due to the low proportion of telecommunications firms in our sample of firms
with both Tekes evaluation grades. ***, **, *, and a  denote significance at 1, 5, 10, and 15% level. Southern Finland is our base region.
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A.5. Cross-validation
In the Table below, we present the cross-validation figures for the application and the
investment equations. Cross-validation figures were calculated using equation (2.22) in
Yatchew (1998).
Table A.5
Cross-validation of the Application and R&D Investment Equations
Specification Application Equation R&D Investment
Equation
Linear term 0.0595 0.7961
+2nd power 0.0602 0.7982
+2nd and 3rd  power 0.0586 0.8006
+2nd -4th  power 0.0635 0.8039
+ 2nd and 3rd powers
and 1st  order interactions
between continuous variables
0.0982 -
Notes: the linear term is the effect of expected subsidies on expected discounted profits in
the application equation, and the propensity score transformation that DNV use (Mills ratio) in the
R&D investment equation.  The base specification is the same as in the ML estimations.
